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SMOOTHING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN FOREIGN
AND DOMESTIC LAW: COMMENTS ON
PROFESSORS DODGE, GOLOVE,
AND STEPHAN
Richard A. Epstein*

INTRODUCTION

Two of the three papers on which I have been asked to comment
address issues involving the importation of foreign into American law.
The third paper raises, with a somewhat more general focus, the coordination of activities between foreign and American legal systems.
Professor William Dodge discusses the extent to which the procedures
under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may, or
should, be used to superintend the (perverse) outcomes of the American legal system.1 Professor David Golove asks the extent to which
treaties entered into by the United States can, or should, be effective
as domestic legislation. 2 Professor Paul Stephan then asks the extent
to which American courts should pass judgment on the quality of foreign legal systems in the course of resolving legal questions over the
coordination of their law with our system. 3 Before commenting
briefly on each of these three papers, let me give a short account of
my approach to the full range of jurisdictional and procedural
problems that deal with the incorporation of civil justice concepts
from afar into the American system.
The bottom line is this: the structure of these problems countenances modest expectations about our ability to reconcile inconsistent
legal commands. The message I take from these three papers is that it
is never easy to tidy up the loose ends so as to give full and equal
respect to the judgments and traditions of what are, when all is said
*
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and done, inconsistent legal systems. This venerable problem of domestic law transfers without missing a beat into an international context responding to the procedural, choice of law, and jurisdictional
issues that frequently arise in more muted forms within our own federal system. Loose ends always remain loose. The difficulty here is
distinguishable from the usual problem of substantive law, where the
implementation of a program takes two steps. The first issue concerns
principle and policy. Regardless of the subject matter, the initial step
is to envision the ideal set of relationships between the parties. The
next step asks how the pursuit of these ideals must be tempered by the
institutional realities in which any substantive law is embedded. We
dare not assume a zero transaction cost system of enforcement, nor a
zero error rate in setting out legal rules. However attractive it may be
to regard all serious promises as enforceable, with real estate contracts
and guarantees we nonetheless routinely enforce those promises evidenced in writing. While in principle we may think that any person
with ordinary competence and intelligence should be allowed to drive
an automobile, we nonetheless impose a minimum age requirement of
sixteen years for all drivers. Ad hoc determinations are sometimes
too expensive to make.
These tradeoffs will differ from legal system to legal system. But no
matter how they are resolved, so long as the dispute is confined to
individuals governed by a single jurisdiction, we know which unique
rule controls. The inconsistent commands of two systems working
side-by-side causes no operational imbalance for either system. The
situation parallels one where each of two separate communities develop different customary practices for, say, interpreting contracts. So
long as they do not collide, each can go on its merry way. But once
business cuts across boundaries, then some court must decide which
set of formalities (or indeed any formalities) should govern and why.
The overlap between two systems invites a clash of customs, practices,
and legal rules. Each system has already held that its own view of the
world is sound, so that any across-border reconciliation necessarily requires that either system, if not both systems, give way on some part
of its preferred solution. In principle, the magic balance-wheel should
make only those compromises that minimize the dislocation suffered
on both sides. So it is these jurisdictional and procedural issues that
have an irreducible messiness, which is good reason to review all of
these papers with a sympathetic eye.
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II.

DODGE

The task that Dodge sets before himself asks the extent to which
NAFTA does, or should, require an arbitral review of litigation outcomes made in ordinary trials in American courts. Intervention under
NAFTA has the distinct mission of ensuring that member nation
states create an environment that facilitates investment by foreign individuals and firms. One key ingredient of that basic obligation is a
stable system of legally enforceable copyright and property rights.
Thereafter Section 1011 guards against "expropriation" by local gov4
ernments against foreign interests.
The formal law on NAFTA is, at this point, in a clear state of flux.
To place it in focus, Dodge discusses in depth the well-known dispute
involving the Loewen Group. 5 There, a variety of contractual, antitrust and interference with contract claims resulted in a Mississippi
judgment of one-hundred million dollars in actual damages (including
damages for emotional distress) and a judgment of four-hundred million dollars in punitive damages, which led (or at least contributed) to
Loewen's bankruptcy. Shortly thereafter, the Loewen group sued not
Mississippi (and remember no state is a signatory to the treaty) but
the United States for its failure under NAFTA to provide the appropriate legal safeguards for Loewen.
Unless one examines the factual record in great detail (which I have
not), it is hard to make an informed judgment about the soundness of
the Mississippi judgment. It seems clear that Loewen mounted a
highly flawed defense, which easily explains why it lost but does not
necessarily explain why it lost by so much. I agree with Professor
Dodge's general view that it would be better if aggrieved foreign litigants were required to exhaust their domestic remedies before taking
refuge in suits against the United States. But given the state of recent
affairs, I regard any large judgment coming out of Mississippi as presumptively tainted in light of its overall record in dealing with tort
litigation, which can only be regarded as deplorable. 6 Even if that
should prove to be the case, it hardly establishes the wisdom of a
procedure that allows quick resort to international arbitral procedures
before the local system has a chance to work through its errors. The
better procedure for NAFTA would require the exhaustion of national remedies before moving to the arbitral setting where the dis4. North American Free Trade Agreement. Dec. 8-17. 1992. ch. 11. 32 I.L.M. 605. 639-49.
5. The Loewen Group. Inc. v. United States. ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3.
6. See, e.g.. Roger Parloff, Asbestos: The $200 Billion Miscarriageof Justice. FORTUNE. Mar. 4.
2002. at http://www.fortune.com/indexw.jhtml?channel=artcol.jhtml&doc-id=206477 (last visited

Oct. 3. 2002).
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pute is no longer with the other party to the litigation but with the
United States.
My only quibble on this point has to do with Dodge's argument that
the domestic law on key issues is better formed than its arbitral alternative. He gives by way of example the confused decisions under Article 11 of NAFTA, where it is unclear whether its general prohibition
against expropriation applies to regulatory takings. Here that question is hardly clear on its face because the word "expropriation" surely
smacks of putting government padlocks on the gates of foreign plants.
But the word "taking" has a similar ambiguity, for it looks as though
the landowner has to be removed from possession in order for the
property to be taken. Yet the American courts have shied away from
the implication that landowners can only gain relief after the government locks them out of the premises, for otherwise a landowner who
has been stripped of all rights to use and dispose of land would be
treated as though nothing at all has been taken from him. Dodge is
correct to say that NAFTA has not yet developed standards for dealing with expropriation, but unfortunately, it is wrong to say that the
host of chaotic Supreme Court decisions on the subject has yielded
any clear or defensible standard on the matter either. Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council 7 stands for the proposition that a total
wipeout of all economic use of the property counts as a taking even if
the government does occupy the land. Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City8 stands for the proposition that allowing one to
continue with an existing use, but not allowing any new uses, does not
count as a taking, even if the foregone uses were highly valuable. Between these two holdings lies the common case where undeveloped
land is subject to some restrictions on the permissible set of uses. To
this day, the United States Supreme Court has not given any coherent
formula to decide which of these diminutions in value is compensable
and which not: its most recent effort in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 9 shows again the
inability of the Court to reach closure on this matter. There is no
reason to think that the repeated inability to form a coherent body of
law should be treated as a reason for using American law to adopt
these provisions. But his argument should not turn on that one point.
Even if the Supreme Court were weak in this area and strong in that,
7. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
8. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

9. 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002). For more information on the Lake Tahoe Case, see Richard A.
Epstein. The Ebbs and Flows in Takings Law: Reflections on the Lake Tahoe Case, I
Ci. RFv. 5 (2002).

CATO
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it seems as though the burdens on the international system of arbitration will be reduced if the domestic system is given first crack to resolve the disputes in question. I agree with Professor Dodge on this
point.
III.

GOLOVE

Professor Golove raises a very different problem-the integration
of the treaty power with the system of domestic legislation. As is well
known, the President has "the Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur.""' These treaties pack real punch because
"all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land"' l of coordinate
stature with domestic legislation that is passed only by both houses,
subject to the Presidential veto and its override.
The question that Professor Golove sets for himself involves the
tension between the treaty power and other elements of the domestic
system. Congress is a branch of government with enumerated powers.
The treaty power imposes no specific subject matter limitation on the
President or Senate. Now the structural challenge is this: Can the
President and Senate (without the cooperation of the House of Representatives, no less) conclude treaties that fall outside Congress's
enumerated powers and thereby circumvent the domestic law making
process? Can the President and Senate conspire to adopt treaties that
require the individual states to abandon their practices on matters that
Congress could not override their local decisions through legislation?
The risk of this end-run has long preoccupied the Senate, and Professor Golove does not give any concrete instance where the President
and Senate have so acted to provoke a constitutional confrontation.
To the extent that we do not see the President and Senate push to the
edges of their powers, so much the better. But that said, what tests
could be devised hypothetically to decide whether the President and
Senate have abused the treaty power in ways inconsistent with the
constitutional structure?
Golove thinks that it is possible to articulate principles that could
guide a conscientious senator in deciding whether or not to vote for a
particular treaty. But as these tests are heavily tied to the motivations
that individual senators or groups of senators have to the legislation,
he does not urge that we use these standards for judicial review to
10. U.S. CONST. art.

11,§ 2.

11. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
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determine whether the treaties were properly signed and ratified. In
principle, this halfway house is most uneasy; it would be better to find
some way to apply judicial review to determine whether the President
and Senate did overstep their joint powers. We use that test for judicial review of congressional action, 12 just as judicial review applies for
congressional actions that could not be justified under the police
power.
Unfortunately, Professor Golove's motivational test does not permit that to happen. Under his test, the key element is whether the
treaty is ratified to circumvent constitutional limitations (bad) or to
advance some legitimate foreign policy objective, even at the cost of
trampling on local interests (good). But how does one police that distinction? To be sure, if the President and Senate had no knowledge of
the test, then they might display their true colors. But once the test is
articulated, then it should be an easy matter to find some foreign objective that treaty ratification will serve. Thus, the Senate could vote
to ratify a treaty that forbids the states to execute juveniles because it
wishes to increase the odds of having foreign nations, which abuse this
practice, follow suit. At that point the obvious dual motive might not
be sufficient to invalidate the treaty. So long, therefore, as the desire
to lead by example in international affairs counts as a serious justification for signing treaties, then the treaty power becomes plenary de
facto, so little can be done to prevent the treaty power from mounting
an end-run around federalism limitations contained in the
Constitution.
Yet, can we find a better test? Here it is perhaps easier to see the
possible solution without starting with the human rights treaties that
are Golove's main concern. It also arises with variations in Missouri
v. Holland,1 3 which upheld the 1918 Migratory Bird Treaty Act against
Missouri's claim that it invaded the rights reserved to the states under
the Tenth Amendment. The recitals in the treaty indicated how these
birds were important as a source of food and pest control to both
countries but were at risk for extermination because of insufficient
protection, which the treaty sought to supply. When the case was decided, commerce power did not extend (at least unambiguously) to
the regulation and preservation of migratory birds. The treaty took
the form of a bilateral contract between two nations, in which each
agreed to take certain steps to protect a resource that both shared.

12. See, e.g.. United States v. Lopez. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
13. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes opined that the treaty was valid notwithstanding the Tenth Amendment objection.
Now suppose, however, that the treaty regulated territorial birds (or
for that matter land animals) that never ventured out of the territorial
limits of Missouri. Could the Senate insist that it was so important to
lead by example that the treaty power could be invoked to uphold a
treaty in which Canada agreed to take care of its territorial birds in
order for us to take care of ours? My deepest instincts say that this
pattern of obligations fails regardless of the motivation of the Senate.
In contrast, Missouri v. Holland contains just the kind of quid pro quo
that we expect from treaties. Stated otherwise, the test should ask
whether the treaty supplied a quid pro quo for the United States, or
whether it just led to the imposition of parallel regimes with foreign
nations in cases where we could not have reason to bring suits for
damages, injunctions, or other forms of legal relief against other signatory nations. For the most part, human rights treaties look less like
migratory bird treaties and more like territorial bird treaties. The object is to bind the states to be humane to their juveniles so that other
nations will be humane to theirs. On structural, not motivational
grounds, these treaties should not be accepted. A somewhat more difficult case is one where the United States agrees with a foreign nation
to impose minimum environmental or labor standards on its work
force in order to advance humane objectives and to create some form
of "competitive balance" between the labor markets in the two states.
On the test proposed here, the second justification should prevail
(however distasteful one might find it in principle) and that treaty
should be sustained.
No cases to my knowledge have started down this uncertain road.
My guess is that the Supreme Court would be unwilling to follow it to
the end. If that is the case, then perhaps we should give up on the
exercise of outlining in constitutional language the terrain over which
the President and Senate can operate. It becomes better, at a guess,
to recognize that there are no effective tests to sort out permissible
from impermissible treaties. At this point, all the arguments about
motivation remain important as ways to influence presidential action
and senatorial votes. The motivational arguments still have political
force, even if they no longer assume a constitutional dimension.
IV.

STEPHAN

Professor Stephan's article presents an inquiry into the proper attitudes that American courts bring in deciding what laws to apply in
disputes that contain some substantial foreign component. The source

670

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:663

of this difficulty is easy to see. On the world stage, different nations
have different kinds of legal systems. Some of which, in principle, are
worthy of emulation and respect, while others most decidedly are not.
One simple question is whether the implicit respect that American
courts have for various overseas jurisdictions should influence their
willingness to hear cases in the United States, even when their center
of gravity lies elsewhere, because of their lack of confidence in the
ability of foreign tribunals to deliver justice on the disputes before
them.
Professor Stephan is of two minds on this question. On the one
hand, he notes his evident uneasiness with a decision in the Second
Circuit that allowed suits to be brought against international corporations in the United States for alleged misdeeds done to Nigerian citizens in Nigeria. Thus in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 14 the
Second Circuit upheld jurisdiction over Royal Dutch Petroleum in the
United States because it operated a local office that supervised its
publicity activities related to the New York Stock Exchange. The
charges in that case seemed far-fetched, and the relevance of New
York or United States law seemed dubious; this is hardly the broad
range of activities that one would hope to see in connection with general jurisdiction. Since all the relevant events took place overseas,
New York was, to say the least, an inconvenient forum.
Recently, I have written on the awkwardness of a theory of personal jurisdiction that allows seizure of the person within the state to
give jurisdiction over all matters wholly unrelated to it.'5 That deep
concern about the misuse of power applies with equal force in the
international context to cases like Wiwa. There are many wretches
whom we should bring to justice. But our courts are often not the
place to do it. The hard question arises in connection with those suits
that allege an array of supportive actions in the United States that in
turn are alleged to hold it "indirectly" responsible for serious wrongs
that have been committed overseas, perhaps on authorization from
the top people in this country. Here it is harder to maintain a categorical denunciation of lawsuits-what if the Shell Oil Company had
records in its home office ordering the murder of the Ogoni people?
But the real question here is whether the case gets into this country on
the strength of allegations of that sort when the courts of Great Britain and the Netherlands remain open. Remember, these cases could
14. 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). Professor Stephan notes other cases that raise the same issues.
See Stephan. supra note 3. at n.8.
15. See. e.g., Richard A. Epstein. Consent, Not Power, as the Basis of Jirisdiction.2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 1.
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have been brought in respectable fora, with much more extensive connections to the defendant. Whatever this grant of jurisdiction does to
solve one problem, it creates another. The obvious practical danger is
that large corporations will be hung out to dry on improbable charges
in a forum that could easily harbor deep-seated hostility toward them.
If courts are willing to give a broad account to general personal jurisdiction, then it seems as though the forum non conveniens doctrine
should be given broad play to send this case packing. I agree with
Professor Stephan, the recent developments that contract the use of
that doctrine are unwelcome.
Professor Stephan, however, seems to switch gears in his evaluation
of Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 16 where the
question was which of two Russian entities owned a particular copyright to certain Russian stories. Here the court decided that the place
of infringement was the United States, but the place of authorship was
Russia. Accordingly, the court decided to make its best guess of the
Russian law of copyright ownership. In my view, this seems like the
correct decision in that copyrights run around the world (albeit under
separate giants), and it would be most unfortunate if their ownership
in Canada, say, should be found to differ from that of their ownership
in the United States, which could happen under Stephan's fragmentation of the ownership approach. This preference for a single determination of copyright ownership is wholly consistent with our own
constitutional design, which from the outset created a fount of federal
law for both copyright and patent, precisely to avoid inconsistencies in
copyrights and patents across state boundaries. 17 All other things being equal, larger jurisdictions do better for intellectual property, which
instantly expands to fill the applicable legal space.
There are, moreover, no risks to any distinctive American interests
no matter which way this question is decided, so that we should abide
by the Russian decision unless and until some clear evidence is produced to suggest that Russian institutions have skewed this decision in
order to gain some undeserved tactical advantage in the United
States. But even if that should crop up, then the right response is to
allow the Russians to first dispense their justice and then to allow the
losing party to overturn the result only on clear proof that the proceedings in Russia were wholly corrupt. In general, however, the best
approach in these areas is not to make judgments to take or turn down
cases based on our perceived quality of the decisions overseas. It is to
16. 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1998).
17. See U.S. CoNsT. art. 1. § 8.
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apply standard principles of jurisdiction and choice of law, and to let
the chips fall where they may. We should not circumvent the Russian
system any more than we should avoid Nigeria (or the United Kingdom or the Netherlands in Wiwa).
This conclusion ties in with the principle of loose parity between the
United States and other nations that I defended at the outset. We
should be prepared (as we often are not) to abandon the role of a nine
hundred-pound gorilla in international affairs. We have to recognize
that all nations have interests that run beyond their territories, and we
must be prepared to stay our hand influencing matters overseas if we
are to ask other nations to do the same. The system of national
boundaries forces us to recognize that there are activities that we care
about outside our borders on which we must nonetheless not have the
final word. A deep concern about the affairs of the world is not the
same as a direct financial stake in the outcome of certain events overseas. It is one thing to be worried about the instability in Russia for its
own stake. It is another thing to be worried about a Russian cartel
that seeks to do business in the United States. We should worry about
the real stakes in the second case and be chary about seeking to vindicate our broad sense of concern in the former.
V.

DISTRIBUTIVE AND EXPRESSIVE FUNCTIONS

This general attitude to litigation means that, whatever my disagreements with Professor Stephan on Iter-Tass, I strongly endorse his suspicion to the "expressive" as opposed to "distributive" function of
courts. The distributive function in this terminology refers to the necessity that courts adjudicate claims to ownership and legal rights.
This is the indispensable function of any system of dispute resolution,
and the first order of judicial business is to resolve the disputes before
it, not to pontificate about the general state of the world. The expressive function invites courts to undertake that second job, and I agree
with Stephan that taking on a second role compromises the ability of a
court to discharge its primary function.
In making this statement, I do not wish to be understood as insisting
that courts decide only one case at a time or defer to juries on matters
of fact or legislatures on matters of constitutionality. In some cases,
aggressive intervention is justified both in resolving disputes and in
setting out precedent for future cases. But it would be very odd on
this view for courts to be against settlement-if the parties can resolve
the dispute themselves, they can increase certainty and save money.
Owen Fiss argued that these settlements deprive us of a public good in
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the form of more law.18 But it could easily be said that we have too
much law already, and that settlements under law only strengthen our
confidence in the current legal rules while reducing the costs that lawyers and laymen must bear in finding out what the law means. It
would be odd to reach out to conclude cases that would otherwise
disappear. It is equally odd in the cases that remain to reach out beyond the deliberation of the factual or legal matters in the case to send
some message to a segment of the community about, for example, the
soundness of foreign legal systems. It is too easy for courts to conclude that the message is more important than the case, and thus by
degrees to give the facts contained on the record less attention than
they deserve.
In stressing the dominance of the distributive function, my point is
not that no one should stress the expressive function-quite the opposite. That function properly falls within the province of journalists and
broadcasters, academics and lawyers, and ordinary citizens. But here
when they express their views on these matters, there is no conflation
of the two functions. Rather, since all these actors are powerless, it is
appropriate for them to exercise as much or as little influence that
they can command in the world of ideas. But things go awry when we
try to fold the expressive function into ordinary judgments. Professor
Stephan quotes a well-intentioned but misguided statement of the role
of civil judgments from a well-known civil procedure casebook:
A court's favorable judgment is a solemn pronouncement that the
victor has acted properly on the basis of a factually accurate understanding of reality. A favorable judgment is an affirmation of the
prevailing party's rationality and good citizenship .... All these
benefits have a considerable psychological as well as material
value. 19
Not so. Too many grubby realities stand in the path of this utopian
vision. In some cases, the court system is itself sufficiently biased as to
be worthy of contempt. That may well be the case with Mississippi
tort law today. It surely has been the case in many other situations as
well. But even if we assume any individual court is unerring in its
judgment, then inference from favorable judgment to "rationality and
good citizenship" is strained at best. In one case a court may hold that
the good Samaritan owed no duty to rescue a stranger even when it
could have been done with little or no cost or inconvenience. That
same court could easily conclude that a moral obligation did lie, even
if it should not be enforced as a matter of law. That is hardly an affir18. Owen M. Fiss, Against Setlement. 93 YAu L.J. 1073 (1984).
19. JAMES FLEMING. JR., ET AL.. CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.5 (4th ed. 1992).
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mation of the defendant's virtue. In other cases, plaintiffs recover
even though they are criminal trespassers on the defendant's land.
Once again, no virtue here. In some cases, the defendant is accorded
an absolute immunity for larger systematic ends, even if it means that
the plaintiff goes home empty-handed against a scurrilous and dishonest defendant. There is a lot of slippage between the judgment and
the underlying moral reality. It is not a court's job to spell out those
gaps in painful detail. If the case really matters, then other people can
engage in full time and unalloyed expressive activities.
These dangers spill over into the international arena where a fascination with the expressive function could, as in Wiwa, lead to an inversion of priorities and a radical expansion in the scope of United States
jurisdiction in order to provide a bully pulpit from which to speak. It
is not needed, for judges do not have a monopoly on moral indignation. In fact, owing to the confusion of roles, judges should be careful
about their own ex cathedra pronouncements, which could easily color
the perceptions others have of them in the ordinary course of their
official business. The use of rhetoric is unavoidable in judicial settings, but it should be in the service of resolving the cases that come
before the courts.
It therefore follows that Stephan is correct in noting how, in the
international context, a broader conception of the expressive function
can easily undermine the constitutional division of authority of foreign
affairs, between the judiciary on the one hand and the Executive and
Congress on the other. These two bodies between them should take
the initiative in international affairs and speak out on whatever matters they think fit. Their portfolio of business is not shaped by the
institutional limitations of a court. Indeed, they do not have to wait
until legal cases and controversies appear before they speak, nor must
their pronouncements resolve these disputes. They need only address
the political and social ends of the nation. Clean lines of authority
are, in this case, a neat corollary of the principle of separation of
powers.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Professors Dodge, Golove, and Stephan have written about somewhat diverse topics. But one common theme does shine throughout
their work. All three authors think that it is dangerous to develop
unique principles to deal with the interaction of foreign and domestic
law. All start with the assumption that the conventional tools of law
and administration carry over from domestic to international contexts,
and they all start from a sound premise.

